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With photons being the only available candidates for long-distance quantum communication, most quantum
cryptographic devices are physically realized as optical systems that operate a security protocol based on
the laws of quantum mechanics. But to finally yield a stream of bits (secret key) usable for encryption, a
quantum-to-classical transition is required. Synchronization of electronic & optoelectronic components involved
in such tasks thus becomes a necessary and important step. However, it also opens up the possibility of
timing-based loopholes and attacks.
1. Introduction
In a letter [1] to Max Born written in 1926, Albert Ein-
stein remarked: “Quantum mechanics is certainly impos-
ing. But an inner voice tells me that this is not yet the
real thing. The theory says a lot, but does not bring us
any closer to the secrets of the Old One. I, at any rate,
am convinced that He is not playing dice.” This quote,
particularly the last part about God not playing dice, in-
dicates Einstein’s unwillingness to accept a fundamental
tenet of quantum theory: with regards to values of phys-
ical quantities, only statistical assertions can be permit-
ted. Indeed, Einstein and some other prominent scien-
tists were also inclined towards the more classical view
of the world in which physical systems could be ascribed
properties that existed irrespective of whether they were
being measured or not [2]. It was thus believed by some
that quantum mechanics could not provide a complete
description of Nature.
Fast forward to the next century, and with principles
of quantum mechanics having been verified in innumer-
able different experiments, it seems that the earlier view
of those scientists was incorrect. Nonetheless, due to its
bizarre nature and ideas, quantum mechanics still con-
founds anyone who tries to understand it. But thank-
fully, that hasn’t stopped us from exploring and devis-
ing applications that utilize non-classical world features,
such as quantum entanglement and superposition. While
elements of ‘quantum physics in action’ have already
been available to us on daily basis (e.g. barcode scanners,
mobile phones), applications such as quantum comput-
ers, quantum cryptographic systems etc. that have much
wider implications are now also getting deployed [3, 4].
The focus of this article is on quantum key distribution
(QKD) – the most successful and well-known application
of quantum cryptography, as of today. So much so that
they are frequently used interchangeably, and this shall
also be the case with this article.
Figure 1 illustrates the basic scheme of any crypto-
graphic system. Two users Alice and Bob communi-
cate privately (typically using a conveniently-available
medium such as the Internet or telephone network) and
an adversary Eve is interested in knowing the secret that
Fig. 1. Fundamental scenario for cryptography: Two en-
tities, normally called Alice and Bob wish to share a
secret, which a third party usually called Eve (often also
harbouring a malicious intent) is interested in knowing.
they wish to share. Alice and Bob generally use a stream
of bits called keys to protect their communication from
being eavesdropped. While conventional schemes use the
computational hardness offered by public-key cryptog-
raphy (PKC) to prevent such eavesdropping, quantum
cryptography relies on the disturbances – introduced by
an eavesdropper – in the communication of the secret
key between Alice and Bob.
These disturbances can be detected and quantified
and indicate the ultimate level of security that can be
obtained - this depends on the quantum cryptographic
protocol employed. If the protocol runs successfully, Al-
ice and Bob could use methods such as the one-time pad
(OTP) for encrypting and decrypting the actual message
(plain text) that they wish to share. A well-known prop-
erty of OTP is its information-theoretical immunity to
cryptanalysis. Also, to successfully eavesdrop in this sce-
nario, Eve must crack the secret key in real time. This is,
however, not the case with PKC: previously encrypted
messages (that may still be of vital importance, e.g.
military plans) could be cracked if sufficient computa-
tional resources are at disposal and/or faster mathemat-
ical algorithms are discovered. With advances in quan-
tum computing, the day is probably not far when this
would actually happen!
2. A quantum-cryptographic protocol ex-
plained. . . without any quantum mechanics
I shall now endeavour to explain perhaps the most fa-
mous and widely-used QKD protocol. And without re-
1
sorting to any quantum mechanics! That sounds contra-
dictory of course, because if it were possible to classically
explain the innards of a quantum cryptographic proto-
col, then why do physicists delve into the usually unusual
quantum theories at all? So I have to make some unreal-
istic assumptions that will be good enough for capturing
the essence of how the protocol works, but (obviously)
do not suffice to cover all the quantum-mechanical as-
pects. Assume that there exists an unlimited supply of
tiny magical balls with the following characteristics:
P1. The state of a ball is encoded by a number n; for
operation of the protocol, it is chosen to be
amongst the first four positive integers, i.e.
n = {1,2,3,4}. Note that exactly two out of the
four numbers in this set are:
• Odd (n = 1 and 3)
• Even (n = 2 and 4)
• More than 2 (n = 3 and 4)
• Less than 3 (n = 1 and 2)
We denote these four possibilities by keywords
K = {OD,EV,M2, L3}, respectively. The
encoding procedure does not take a number as the
input, instead, it takes a keyword which is chosen
in a random fashion from K.
P2. Uttering a keyword to a ball makes it randomly
pick a suitable value of n that satisfies the
constraint imposed by the keyword. E.g., if the
uttered keyword is M2, both n = 3 and n = 4 are
equally-likely candidates. The ball then encodes
itself with the picked value. Table 1 shows an
example of 12 different balls encoded one after the
other.
P3. Once encoded, a ball retains no memory of the
keyword that was used to encode it. It does know
n itself, but cannot be forced to reveal the value
(even the person who encoded the balls cannot do
it). However, the ball is programmed to truthfully
and logically answer “Yes” or “No” (bit 1 and 0,
respectively) to one and only one of the following
two questions.
a. Is n odd (denoted by nOD)?
b. Is n less than 3 (denoted by nL3)?
Note, if a ball answers “Yes” to the above
questions, it would correspondingly answer “No” to
c. Is n even?
d. Is n more than 2?
In other words, the possibility of n being more
than 2 completely excludes that of n being less
than 3 and vice versa. Similarly, the possibility of
oddness complements the possibility of evenness.
So it suffices to say that asking a [b] is equivalent
to c [d].
P4. An attempt to pry open the ball triggers a
self-demolition procedure and the ball vanishes in
a puff of smoke! Also, after answering a question
the ball falls silent: no amount of prodding or
poking, pleading or praying can make it talk.
Introducing some terminology that shall help as we
proceed, we define the process of encoding the state as
preparation, and the process of questioning a ball as
measurement. Balls are thus prepared and measured in
one of two conjugate pairs (even/odd or more/less) of
possibilities; a possibility is technically called a basis.
Steps of the protocol
Below are the steps that demonstrate how Alice and
Bob can share a secret key using these magical balls:
S1. Alice encodes ‘M’ (ideally, M approaches infinity)
magical balls in the safe environment of her lab or
office. The balls are labelled sequentially and the
encoding keyword for each ball is carefully
recorded.
S2. She sends the labelled balls to Bob using normal
postal services. Note that the postal services can
be unreliable, inefficient or even untrustworthy!
S3. Bob receives ‘W’ balls (W≤M, as some could be
lost on the way), assembles them sequentially, and
randomly measures (asks questions a or b to) each
ball. He carefully records the corresponding
answers. In the end, he obtains a bit sequence
comprising of 0s and 1s (Yes = 1, No = 0).
S4. Bob contacts Alice using an authenticated public
line1 and tells her only of the questions he asked,
but doesn’t divulge the corresponding answers.
S5. For each ball, Alice compares her encoding
keyword (the preparation basis) with the question
(the measurement basis) asked by Bob. Whenever
there is a match, i.e. the preparation basis of Alice
and the measurement basis of Bob coincide; Alice
can correctly predict Bob’s answer. She tells Bob
to keep all these (on an average, this would be
W/2) instances and discard the rest. In this
manner, she finally obtains a bit sequence
comprising of 0s and 1s which is identical to that
of Bob. This is the raw secret key!
S6. Alice and Bob publicly compare a few
randomly-chosen bits from their secret key. If these
bits are indeed the same, then they assume the
same holds for the rest of the secret key.
Discarding the publicly-compared bits, Alice and
Bob obtain the final secret key.
1a communication channel open to passive eavesdropping
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Keyword used OD M2 L3 EV L3 M2 EV EV L3 EV OD M2
Value of n 3 4 2 2 1 3 4 2 1 4 1 3
Table 1. Encoding of the magical balls. Balls randomly pick suitable values to encode themselves, e.g. the balls choose
4 and 2 when EV is invoked in slots 7 and 8, respectively. However, in slots 9 and 11, invoking two different keywords
L3 and OD still results in the same value n = 1 encoded.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Keyword used OD M2 L3 EV L3 M2 EV EV L3 EV OD M2
Value of n 3 4 2 2 1 3 4 2 1 4 1 3
Bob’s question nOD nOD nL3 nOD nL3 nL3 nL3 nOD nOD nL3 nOD nL3
Ball’s answer Yes No Yes No Yes No No No Yes No Yes No
Bits (Bob) 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0
Table 2.Magical ball protocol in action. While Alice randomly encodes the balls, Bob randomly questions them. After
discussing on a public channel, they are able to process their data such that they finally obtain the same secret key
(bit sequence in green) with a high probability.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Bits (Alice) 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0
Eve’s question nOD nL3 nL3 nL3 nOD nOD nL3 nL3 nOD nOD nL3 nOD
Ball’s answer Yes No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Value of m 3 3 1 2 3 4 4 1 1 2 2 3
Bob’s question nOD nOD nL3 nOD nL3 nL3 nL3 nOD nOD nL3 nOD nL3
Ball’s answer Yes Yes Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes No No
Bits (Bob) 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0
Table 3. Foiling an eavesdropper. Alice assigns the keywords EV = M2 = 0 and OD = L3 = 1 (first row). Eve
intercepts Alice’s communication, measures the balls herself and depending on the results, prepares a fresh sequence
of balls (with value m) and sends them over to Bob. However, she inevitably makes a mistake, which Alice and Bob
later discover for the cases where they used the same basis but don’t get the same bit (shown in red). To distinguish
between the legitimate users and Eve, the steps performed by the latter are shown in blue (first column).
The steps described above are illustrated using Table 2.
The columns highlighted in green correspond to
situations when Alice and Bob used the same basis. If
Alice simply assigns EV =M2 = bit 0 and
OD = L3 = bit 1, then after discarding instances where
dissimilar basis were used, Alice and Bob are left with
an identical bitstream.
Tackling Eve
To make sure that the magical ball protocol (MBP)
works in an adversary scenario as well, Table 3 shows
the effects introduced by Eve as she tries to gain
knowledge of the key. Eve is assumed to control the
postal services, so the balls are essentially in her
custody until they are delivered to Bob. Due to
assumptions P1–P4, the most suitable methodology for
Eve would be to interrogate the balls herself and
depending on the answers, encode a new sequence of
balls and send them to Bob.
In roughly half of all the ‘W’ instances, Alice and Bob
used the same basis. In about half of these instances,
Eve would’ve used a dissimilar basis. Thus, on average,
Eve induces an error in one-fourth or 25% of all the
instances, discovering which, Alice and Bob can decide
to abort the protocol, discard the key and retry (or
perhaps use a different communication link).
3. Quantum cryptography in practice
The result obtained in the last line of the previous
section is identical to that achieved by the BB84
quantum cryptographic protocol that was proposed by
Charles Bennett and Giles Brassard at a conference in
Bangalore in 1984 [5]. The error rate, called quantum
bit error rate (QBER), is the most important quantity
relevant to the security of any QKD protocol. To
elaborate, at the completion of a QKD protocol, if
Alice and Bob incur an error rate above the threshold
established by the theoretical security proof (of that
protocol), then they discard the key. If the QBER is
below threshold but non-zero, then Alice and Bob use
privacy-amplification techniques [6] to distill a secret
key that reduces Eve’s potential knowledge close to
zero. An eavesdropper (bounded just by quantum
mechanics) is thus destined to be discovered or
thwarted and even an unprecedented amount of
computational power cannot help him/her to stay
concealed !
I shall now explain how a typical QKD protocol is
implemented in real life. Table 4 strives to make a
connection between the realistic implementation of
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Magical Ball Protocol Realistic BB84 protocol
carriers of the
encoded information Tiny magical balls Single photons
communication Quantum channel, e.g. optical
medium Postal services fiber or atmospheric link
Bases for Mathematical property : Physical property (polarization):
preparation and Even/Odd (EV /OD), Horizontal/Vertical (H/V),
measurement More/Less (M2/L3) Diagonal/Anti-Diagonal (D/A)
physical method of Balls give answers Binary system of optical detectors
realizing bits as either Yes or No that either click or don’t.
Other significant Balls can be asked precisely Single photons get destroyed
properties one question, then fall silent once they are detected
Table 4. Analogy between MBP and realistic QKD protocol. Alice prepares photons in one of four possible polarizations
(H,V,D,A) and sends them to Bob on a quantum channel. Bob measures the incoming photons using a system made
from optical components and optoelectronic detectors. A successful detection event is registered when an impinging
photon causes a click in the detector.
H (0)
V (1)
A (1)
D (0)
45°
H/V Zor basis A/D Xor basis
Photon polarization (encoded bit)
Intermediate basis
Fig. 2. Bit encoding and polarization bases in typical
QKD protocol.
BB84 with the magical ball protocol (MBP) described
in the previous section.
A single photon is indeed the tiny magical ball granted
to us by quantum physics. Conjugate bases for
preparing and measuring photons obey the Heisenberg
Uncertainty Principle: only one of the properties from
a conjugate pair can be known with certainty. And
simultaneously, the knowledge of the other (property)
is completely randomized. For QKD, this translates to:
given only the outcome of a measurement, one cannot
perfectly predict which basis had been applied. This is
indeed satisfied by MBP, however, Eve can – within the
framework of quantum mechanics – resort to an
intermediate basis. This carries no classical analogue
and thus defines the realm where the functioning of
MBP departs from that of a QKD protocol.
In practice, these bases can be easily constructed using
the polarization property of photons [7]. Figure 2
geometrically depicts four polarizations H, V, D & A
along with the H/V basis and the D/A basis (usually
denoted by X and Z, respectively) that follow the
weird characteristics P1–P4 of the magical balls. In a
real protocol, Alice starts by encoding classical bits
randomly in the X or Z basis; physically, it means that
photons are randomly encoded in one of four possible
polarizations. Note this differs from the MBP, the
reasons for that shall become clear later. She then
sends the photons over a quantum channel to Bob, who
(independently) measures them in the X or Z basis.
The measurement outcomes are obtained using a
specialized optical detection assembly made from
single-photon detectors (SPDs). One such possible
detector assembly in Bob’s device is shown in Fig. 3.
The basis choice is implemented by a waveplate and
polarizing beam splitter (PBS). A waveplate rotates
the polarization of the input photon depending on the
relative angle θ between its optic axis and the input
polarization. A PBS on the other hand allows a single
photon to be transmitted [reflected] if the photon is in
a horizontal [vertical] polarization. The photon is then
detected by D0 [D1], where the latter numeral signifies
the measurement outcome – the classical bit obtained.
Some key features that apply to a majority of the
currently-known QKD systems are summarized below:
R1. Periodic operation: The sender (usually Alice)
emits optical signals, such as pulses of single photons,
at well-defined times.
R2. Basis choice application: In theory, basis choice
(either preparation or measurement) happens at a
single instant of time. In practice however, this is
usually implemented by application of an electronic
voltage pulse which (obviously) has a finite rise and fall
time.
R3. Dead time of the single-photon detectors:
After a detection event, an SPD is rendered inactive for
a short period of time. This is known as dead time and
normally ranges from a few nanoseconds (ns) to a few
microseconds (µs).
R4. Finite efficiency of detection and dark
counts: Not every single-photon pulse that impinges
on a SPD produces a click. Owing to technological
limitations, typical single-photon detectors employed in
QKD systems click only 10−15% of the times; this no.
4
polarizing beam
splitter (PBS)
waveplate
D1
D0
periodic train of
single-photon pulses
d
e
te
c
to
r 
c
o
n
tr
o
l
&
s
ig
n
a
l 
a
n
a
ly
s
is
basis choice
implementation
quantum channel
Bob
m
a
in
 b
o
a
rd
/c
o
m
p
u
te
r
misc. control/
status signals,
sync. info
basis choice,
secret bitsA
li
c
e
Fig. 3. Schematic of a typical measurement setup for polarization based QKD. Bob randomly chooses θ = 0◦ or 22.5◦
to apply the Z or X basis, respectively. Depending on the incoming state of polarization, a single photon gives a click
in either of the two detectors. E.g. to communicate bit 0, Alice sends either a horizontally- or diagonally- polarized
(H or D) photon. If the waveplate is set at θ = 0◦, the H photon simply transmits through the PBS and gives a click
in D0. But in this situation, a D photon would be transmitted or reflected by the PBS with an equal probability, so
it could give a click in either D0 or D1. However, if the waveplate is set at θ = 22.5◦, then the D photon is rotated
and becomes an H photon, thus getting transmitted through the PBS and yielding a click in D0.
is described as the detection efficiency and is usually
denoted by the Greek letter η. Moreover, a detector
may click even in complete absence of optical input;
this is known as a dark count.
The probability of obtaining a detection click from dark
counts is typically smaller by a factor of 105 or more
than from a single photon. Nonetheless, a legitimate bit
0 then requires not just a click in D0, but also no-click
in D1 (and vice-versa for bit 1).
Since SPDs operate at extremely low levels of light,
they are activated only for the short duration when the
periodic single-photon pulses from Alice are expected to
arrive. The detector control, utilizing synchronization
info (refer Fig. 3), electronically opens a window on
both detectors at the time a single photon may impinge
upon them. For the remaining time, the window is kept
closed and the detectors are not much sensitive to stray
light. The information about the measurement outcome
in this time-window, i.e. “which detector clicked?” is
subsequently passed onto the main board/computer.
In Fig. 4, a typical ‘windowed mode’ optical detection
that considers R1–R4 is depicted.
4. Quantum hacks & attacks based on timing
To obtain a tangible security primitive, e.g. the secret
key bitstream, any physical QKD system thus needs to
make a transition from the quantum to classical
domain. Quantum physics may prove that a QKD
protocol, operated under certain assumptions, is secure.
But can practical implementations also certify that
beyond doubt? A quest for the answer to this question
began roughly a decade ago and has led to some
astonishing results [8]; see Fig. 5. Termed ‘quantum
hacking’, this research field has witnessed many
successful proof-of-principle attacks devised and
performed on practical QKD systems. The attacks
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Fig. 4. Detection efficiency as a function of time. The
detector control & signal analysis circuit sends a voltage
pulse to each of the detectors. Due to the finite response
times, the corresponding efficiency curves rise and fall in
a shorter interval. The peak value achieved depends on
the optical & electrical properties of the detector mate-
rial, the applied electronic voltage etc.
primarily show how an eavesdropper obtains partial or
full info about the secret key without breaching the
QBER threshold. It should be stressed that a majority
of the eavesdropping strategies utilized differences
between the security proof of the QKD protocol (a.k.a.
the theoretical model) and the actual implementation.
These differences mainly arise due to technical
imperfections or deficiencies of the hardware, such as
single-photon detectors.
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Fig. 5. Rising popularity of quantum hacking. The
bar chart shows the growing no. of publications de-
voted to (experimentally) finding and exploiting limi-
tations of practical QKD systems. Only papers from
peer-reviewed journals have been considered, so this
is by no means an exhaustive list. ID Quantique
(http://www.idquantique.com) and MagiQ Technologies
(http://www.magiqtech.com) were the first two compa-
nies to commercialize QKD.
The main topic of this article is quantum hacking
activities that fall under the gamut of timing attacks.
In the following, I shall discuss a few (published) works
that share the common theme of exploiting time as a
parameter or variable to compromise the security of
QKD. I shall, while resorting to the minimum possible
technical details, elaborate the following:
• Main exploitable vulnerability
• Principle of the attack
• Result and impact
General & specific countermeasures to prevent/detect
these attacks and implications of quantum hacking on
QKD will be discussed in the end.
A. Effects of detector efficiency mismatch on security
of quantum cryptosystems
For the correct working of a QKD protocol the
measurement outcome should be random [deterministic]
whenever the preparation basis is different than [equal
to] the measurement basis. It entails here that to make
sure this holds true for practical QKD, it is mandatory
that the chances of detection by D0 and D1 are equally
likely, i.e. any discrimination between the detectors
should not be possible. However, realistically speaking,
it is impossible to construct two identical detectors.
Even if one manages to make them very similar, their
respective detection windows – while individually being
open during the arrival time of a photon – are still
prone to shift relative to each other. This could
happen, e.g. due to finite manufacturing tolerances,
such as tiny optical path length differences or circuit
length differences, which fluctuate because of
temperature variations etc. and thus are very hard to
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Fig. 6. Temporal detector efficiency mismatch. a) Apart
from a minor difference in the peak value and overall
shape, the efficiencies overlap each other quite well, or
temporal mismatch is negligible. This would be alright
for a practical QKD system. b) The mismatch is rather
pronounced and could arise due to electrical differences,
e.g. the length of the circuit wire to D0 may be slightly
shorter than the one to D1, so the “window open” pulse
dispatched by the detector control reaches D0 roughly
0.4 ns before D1. As a result, the single-photon pulse in
b) sees a vastly different efficiency of detection.
control. In such a situation, the system exhibits a
detection efficiency mismatch in time and this was the
main topic of a paper [9] by researchers from the
Norwegian University of Science and Technology
(NTNU) and St. Petersburg State Polytechnic
University. Figure 6 illustrates the case of two detectors
in Bob responding differently to single photons that
impinge upon them at the same instant of time.
Furthermore, the researchers also theoretically
proposed a special kind of intercept-and-resend
strategy (see Table 3) to eavesdrop in such a scenario.
Eve intercepts and measures the states sent by Alice on
the quantum channel to Bob. Depending upon a
measurement outcome, she resends a new state
prepared in such a manner that it would produce a
detection event in Bob, if and only if his measurement
basis is opposite to Eve’s preparation basis. In this way,
Eve imposes faked detection events in Bob and hence,
such an attack is referred to as the faked-states attack.
Although this paper was primarily a theoretical study,
i.e. it did not demonstrate an attack on a QKD system
as a whole, yet it is considered as a landmark paper
because its main ideas have formed the core of
countless eavesdropping strategies in last 5 years. In
fact, two of the attacks that I shall discuss further on
are based on detector efficiency mismatch (DEM) and
two utilize the concept of faked states!
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Fig. 7. Timing side channel attack. Timing histograms
collected from all four measurement possibilities (blue
labels) show different centroid locations. At angle θ =
22.5◦ (X basis) the separation between peaks of D0 and
D1 is especially prominent; once the basis choice is re-
vealed on the public channel, Eve has some chance to
know if the obtained bit was 0 or 1. Figure reproduced
with permission, c©2007 Optical Society of America.
B. Breaking a quantum key distribution system
through a timing side channel
It should be clear how critical it is for the detectors of a
QKD system to appear indistinguishable to the outside
world (especially Eve). Researchers from National
University of Singapore in 2007 showed how timing
information revealed during public discussion between
Alice and Bob (S4 & S5 in the protocol, section 2)
could allow an adversary to discern between the
detectors and hence, eavesdrop without introducing
perceptible errors.
As such it seems implausible to think of a correlation
between measurement outcomes and publicly
exchanged timing information (e.g. synchronization
timestamps). However, if the timing info (between
Alice and Bob) is communicated with a high resolution,
an eavesdropper could perhaps know the answer to
which detector clicked just by carefully scrutinizing the
timestamps! Figure 7 depicts a histogram of the optical
detection timings from the compromised QKD
system [10] and conveys the idea of this attack.
Technically, this may be due to the same reasons that
cause the detector efficiency mismatch (explained in
the previous attack). More qualitatively, this should be
understood as inadvertent encoding of information
about the secret key in undesired degrees of freedom.
These degrees of freedom are formally called side
channels and have been extensively explored in
classical cryptography. The info about the secret key
that Eve could obtain with such an attack was also
evaluated theoretically. Detection systems
time (ns)
-2 -1 0 1 2 3
Legitimate single-photon
pulse from Alice to Bob
Single-photon pulse
time shifted by Eve
η0 η1
delayedadvanced
Alice Bob
fiber-optic channel
Alice Bob
Eve
a)
b)
Normal
Hacked
long arm
short arm
5
10
15
ef
fi
ci
en
cy
 (
%
)
0
Fig. 8. Time-shift attack. To eavesdrop, Eve simply shifts
– advances or delays – the legitimate optical signals from
Alice that are on the way to Bob. This could be achieved
by using an assembly of optical switches and delay fibers
as shown in the Hacked case.
uncompensated by a mere 0.5 ns – an amount that can
go easily unnoticed in usual experimental setups –
could allow the eavesdropper an access ≥ 25% of the
key! Thus, the loophole exposes an important issue
which cannot be overlooked.
C. Experimental demonstration of time-shift attack
against practical quantum-key-distribution systems
Researchers from University of Toronto made an
attempt to exploit the aforementioned DEM
vulnerability by performing a time-shift attack [11].
This was the first known (proof-of-principle
demonstration of an) attack on commercial QKD, the
system in this case being manufactured by the Swiss
company ID Quantique. The idea behind the attack,
illustrated in Fig. 8, is quite simple. Eve cuts a section
of the quantum channel and places an assembly of
optical switches that reconnect Alice and Bob via two
fibers, one shorter and other longer than the cut
section.
From the viewpoint of actual execution, the time-shift
attack (TSA) unfortunately suffered from numerous
problems:
1. To apply the attack, the temporal mismatch needs to
stay high, i.e. η0 and η1 peaks should be far apart,
throughout the running of the protocol. As reported by
the authors of this work, this occurred quite rarely (4%
of all the instances).
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Fig. 9. After-gate attack. Eve launches bright pulses that
arrive outside Bob’s detection window, yet they make his
detectors click according to her will.
2. The mismatch not only occurs infrequently, but is
also probabilistic. The efficiency η0 could be left, right
or on top of η1 but Eve cannot predict this at all. The
QKD system also does not reveal any information that
could facilitate Eve in this regard.
3. The magnitude of the highest mismatch is also not
exceptional. Consequently, Eve has to displace the
states to the extremities of the window for executing
TSA. The overall detection rate seen by Bob (and
Alice) would then be much lower than expected, this
could raise alarm.
Thus, the efficacy of eavesdropping is considerably
reduced. Nonetheless, the TSA was instrumental in
bringing realistic QKD into limelight again and
spurring a slew of quantum hacking activities.
D. After-gate attack on quantum cryptosystem
In 2010, researchers from NTNU, Max Planck Institute
for the Science of Light (MPL) and Universidad de
Guanajuato had experimentally demonstrated the
blinding of single-photon detectors (SPDs) in two
different commercial QKD systems [12]. This has
perhaps been the most powerful and the
best-performing hack on QKD so far. In 2011, they
targeted yet another imperfection of these SPDs and
based on the idea of faked states, they were able to
remotely control the measurement outcome in Bob [13].
The limitation that they exposed was that an SPD can
be forced to click when a sufficiently bright pulse
(typically containing millions of photons) hits it in the
dead time, i.e. outside the detection window (see
Fig. 9a). The main principle of the attack is as follows:
1. Eve intercepts the legitimate quantum states from
Alice and measures them. This could be done using an
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Fig. 10. Hacking QKD calibration to induce DEM. Eve
spoofs the calibration pulses such that they still produce
the expected no. of clicks in D0 and D1 while the de-
tection windows are being scanned, but with a relative
delay which induces a temporal DEM.
exact copy of the Bob device. Let us assume she uses
basis X and detects bit 0.
2. She now prepares a bright pulse in the X basis and
times its arrival in Bob such that:
• If Bob chooses the same basis as Eve, all optical
power from the bright pulse is diverted to D0.
• If Bob chooses the other basis, then the power
splits equally among both the detectors.
It turns out that for the SPDs in Bob, there is an
optical power threshold for bright pulses above [below]
which they would always [never] click! This situation is
illustrated in Fig. 9b.
Due to impinging of bright pulses on a SPD, a
phenomenon called afterpulsing is encountered in
practice. This increases dark counts (and hence the
QBER) which could deter Eve, but using some clever
strategies, the researchers were still able to simulate an
attack that showed the possibility of eavesdropping
with the total QBER < 11% at the operating
conditions of the commercial system.
E. Device calibration impacts security of quantum key
distribution
It has been assumed that Alice sends single-photon
pulses and Bob opens a narrow detection window at the
appropriate time to measure them. But how is such
synchronization obtained in the first place? QKD
systems usually run a calibration routine for this
purpose: Alice and Bob exchange timing information to
calibrate their devices, before any secret key exchange.
The commercial QKD system from ID Quantique
implements it (conceptually) as follows:
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1. Alice prepares relatively-bright pulses (containing a
few 1000s of photons) in the H polarization (bit 0
encoded in Z basis) and sends them to Bob.
2. Bob always measures in the X basis. Every photon
in the pulse thus has an equal chance to yield a click in
either D0 or D1.
3. Bob temporally scans the detection windows for D0
and D1 over the incoming pulses while monitoring the
no. of clicks at each scan position.
By independently maximising the no. of clicks in each
detector, Bob not only knows becomes synchronized to
Alice, but also compensates for any detector efficiency
mismatch (DEM). Figure 10a illustrates the optical
scheme. Researchers, primarily from MPL and NTNU,
found a weakness in this calibration routine and
experimentally demonstrated a way to hack it [14]; see
Fig. 10b. Before the calibration pulses reach Bob, Eve
manipulates them such that the photons in the first
temporal half of each pulse are D− polarized (yielding
clicks in D0) and in the latter half are A− polarized
(yielding clicks in D1). An artificial displacement of the
efficiencies is thereby induced, resulting in both large &
deterministic DEM as already depicted in Fig. 6.
F. Other attacks & countermeasures
The attacks described in above are of course not the
only ones proposed/performed on practical QKD
systems. Due to space constraints, I picked what all
could be most easily tagged with timing attacks. The
interested reader is invited to explore contextually
similar works, e.g. the phase remapping attack [15] and
the dead time exploitation of single-photon
detectors [16].
The detector efficiency mismatch (DEM) problem
outlined in A has clearly enabled several timing-based
attacks on QKD so far. It allowed eavesdropping via
time-shift attack (C), faked-state attack (E), or
through exposed timing side channels (B). By carefully
equalizing delays, randomizing basis choice and
truncating precisions, DEM and associated
vulnerabilities can be minimized and these attacks
could be defeated. However, in general, a QKD system
should still characterize timing-related information and
subsequently account for any potential leakage of the
secret key to Eve. Installation of watchdog detectors
and optical isolators in Bob could thwart off bright
pulse attacks (D and E), however, they also decrease
the legitimate throughput. Even more, such technical
plugs & countermeasures that appear intuitively
correct might (however) give rise to new and
unthought-of loopholes. Hence, it is vital to carefully
adapt them to the quantum protocol.
Another recent approach that advocates an altogether
different paradigm of performing QKD is device
independence: no knowledge of how the physical devices
(of Alice and Bob) function is required! The only
necessities are that quantum physics is correct and that
Alice and Bob fully control the signals emitted and
received by their devices [17]. Some new & exciting
proposals in this direction have already claimed to get
rid of most known detector flaws and side
channels [18, 19].
5. Conclusion
In this article, I’ve discussed a coterie of attacks
against QKD systems. There is, however, a vast (and
growing) literature – explored from both fundamental
and technical viewpoints – on security concerns in
practical QKD. The good news is that so far none of
the attacks have been proven insurmountable. So, if we
believe in laws of quantum physics, then we can also
believe that QKD has a future. It is already speculated
that public-key cryptography would be in great danger
if and when quantum computers become a reality. In
light of that, QKD is perhaps the best and most viable
alternative. Nonetheless, it must be stressed that the
role played by physics guarantees merely a single link
in the whole chain of security. In an excellent paper,
very appropriately titled the black paper of quantum
cryptography [20], the authors write:
We believe that this state of affairs cannot be
simply dismissed with a “there have been
examples of bad design of the device”. At any
stage of development, the devices were actually
carefully designed; the security claims of the
authors were accepted as valid by referees and
colleagues. Neither now, nor at any later time,
will one be able to guarantee that the devices
in use are provably good. And it is certainly
not a good idea to close one’s eyes, invoke the
laws of physics and dump on them a
responsibility they cannot possibly bear.
At the beginning of section 4, the question “Will
realistic systems that execute a quantum cryptographic
protocol be able to certify its security claim beyond
doubt?” was posed. The above quote provides a very
suitable answer to that. So, a reasonable and
acceptable level of security is definitely achievable, but
like any other technology, practical QKD must also
undergo a tight scrutiny to weed out vulnerabilities and
patch loopholes.
Finally, I would like to remark that there are
innumerable aspects of practical QKD that could not
be covered by this article. These range from efforts on
standardization of QKD [21] to integrating it into
public networks [22] and even taking it into outer space
using satellites [23]. All in all, the take-home message is
that quantum cryptography is quite a vibrant field with
a tremendous potential for providing a secure
communication technology in the future.
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